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We present results of practical sending-or-not quantum key distribution. In real-life implemen-
tations, we need consider the following three requirements, a few different intensities rather than
infinite number of different intensities, a phase slice of appropriate size rather than infinitely small
size and the statistical fluctuations. We first show the decoy-state method with only a few differ-
ent intensities and a phase slice of appropriate size. We then give a statistical fluctuation analysis
for the decoy-state method. Numerical simulation shows that, the performance of our method is
comparable to the asymptotic case for which the key size is large enough. Our results show that
practical implementations of the sending-or-not quantum key distribution can be both secure and
efficient.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to share unconditional secret keys based
on the laws of quantum physics [1, 2], even in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper, Eve. However, in real-life im-
plementations of QKD, it’s practical security is still ques-
tionable due to the device imperfections, such as the im-
perfect source and detectors. Fortunately, by using the
decoy-state method [3–13], it has been shown that the
unconditional security of QKD can still be assured with
an imperfect single-photon source [14, 15]. To avoid the
detector side channel attacks, the measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) was proposed [16, 17].
The decoy-state MDI-QKD can remove all detector side-
channel attack with imperfect single-photon sources.
With the developments [3–19] in both theory and ex-
periment, it is more and more hoped to extensively ap-
plied in practice, though there are barriers for so. Among
them, the transmission loss of photons for long distance
QKD has become the major obstacle in practical imple-
mentations. Very recently, with the technology of long
distance single-photon interference, the twin-field quan-
tum key distribution (TF-QKD) has been presented [22].
The original TF-QKD does not offer the information-
theoretic security. By switching between a Test mode and
a Code mode, the TF-QKD* protocol with information-
theoretic security has been shown [24]. A more efficient
protocol for TF-QKD with sending or not sending the co-
herent state has been given in [25]. In the sending-or-not
protocol [25], Alice and Bob do not take post selection
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for the bits in Z basis (signal pulses) and hence the tra-
ditional calculation formulas directly apply.
In Ref. [25], a security analysis is provided for sending-
or-not QKD asymptotically. In the asymptotic case, the
number of different intensities is infinite, the phase slice is
infinitely small and the key size is large enough. However,
in any real implementations, these requirements can no
be fulfilled. In practice, we need consider the situations
with a few different intensities rather than infinite num-
ber of different intensities, a phase slice of appropriate
size rather than infinitely small size and the statistical
fluctuations. In this paper, we proceed further and anal-
ysis the performance of the sending-or-not QKD under
the above real-life assumptions.
First, we need reveal the decoy-state method with only
a few different intensities and a phase slice of appropri-
ate size to estimate the lower bound of the yield and the
upper bound of the phase-flip error rate for the single-
photon state. Furthermore, we also need to consider the
statistical fluctuations. In order to make the utmost de-
crease the effect of statistical fluctuations, the instances
for basis unmatched are also used to estimate the lower
bound of the yield for the single-photon state.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we shall first review the four-intensity decoy-
state method for sending-or-not QKD, and then perform
a statistical fluctuation analysis on it in Sec. III. We then
present the numerical simulation results in Sec. IV. The
article is ended in Sec. V with a concluding remark.
II. THE DECOY-STATE METHOD WITH A
FEW DIFFERENT INTENSITIES AND A PHASE
SLICE OF APPROPRIATE SIZE
In the four-intensity decoy-state sending-or-not pro-
tocol, Alice and Bob randomly choose the X-window
2(decoy pulses) and Z-window (signal pulses) to send or
not to send a phase-randomized coherent pulse to an un-
trusted party, Charlie, who is expected to perform inter-
ference measurement. When one and only one of the two
detectors clicks, Charlie obtains an effective event. Then
Alice and Bob can distill the final secret key with post-
selection and post-processing. The protocol is detailed
below.
1. Alice and Bob repeat Steps 2-3, N times. All the
public announcements by the legitimate users Alice
and Bob are done over an authenticated channel.
2. Alice and Bob randomly choose X-window and Z-
window with probabilities pX and 1 − pX respec-
tively. In X-window, both Alice and Bob prepare
and send the decoy pulses. Explicitly they ran-
domly choose three sources ραi with probability
pi for i = 0, 1, 2, where ρα0 = |0〉〈0| is the vac-
uum source, ρα1 and ρα2 are two coherent sources
with intensity µ1 and µ2 (µ1 < µ2) respectively.
In Z-window, Alice (Bob) randomly prepares and
sends the coherent state ραz with probability pz
and sends nothing else.
3. Charlie measures the incoming signals and records
which detector clicks. When the quantum com-
munication is over, he publicly announces all the
information about the detection event. The situa-
tion when one and only one detector (detector 0 or
detector 1) makes a count is denoted as an effec-
tive event. Alice and Bob collect all the data with
effective events and discard all the others.
4. Alice and Bob announce the basis information (X-
window or Z-window) firstly. Then they announce
the bit values and phase information corresponding
to the effective events when Alice or Bob choose
X-window. With these information, Alice and Bob
obtain the observable Njk(j, k = 0, 1, 2, z) being
the number of instances when Alice and Bob send
state ραj and ραk respectively. Correspondingly,
the lowercases njk are used to denote the number
of effective events. The yields can be defined as
Sjk = njk/Njk. Explicitly, we have
N00 = p
2
0NX + 2p0(1− pz)NXZ ,
N01 = N10 = p0p1NX + (1− pz)p1NXZ , (1)
N02 = N20 = p0p2NX + (1− pz)p2NXZ ,
where p0 = 1 − p1 − p2 is the probability to send
a vacuum pulse in X-window, NX = p
2
XN is the
number of instances when both Alice and Bob
choose X-window and NXZ = pX(1− pX)N is the
number of instances when Alice chooses X-window
and Bob chooses Z-window.
5. Define two sets C∆+ and C∆− that contain the
instances when both Alice and Bob send ρ1 in
X-window with the phase information θA and θB
falling into the slice |θA−θB| ≤ ∆/2 and |θA−θB−
π| ≤ ∆/2 respectively. The number of instances in
C∆± are N
∆
±
11 =
∆
2pi
N11. The number of effective
events corresponding to C∆± are denoted by n
∆
±
0
11
and n
∆
±
1
11
for detector 0 and detector 1 respectively.
6. With these observable in Step.5, Alice and Bob can
estimate the lower bound of s1 and the upper bound
of eph
1
by using the decoy-state methods shown be-
low. Then the post-processing can be performed
and the final key length can be calculated with the
following formula
Nf = n1[1−H(eph1 )]− fntH(EZ), (2)
where Nf is the number of final bits, n1 is the
number of effective events caused by single-photon
states in Z-basis when Alice decides sending while
Bob decides not sending or Alice decides not send-
ing while Bob decides sending, eph
1
is the phase-flip
error rate for instances of n1, nt is the number of
effective events when both Alice and Bob choose Z-
window and EZ is the corresponding bit-flip error
rate.
In the above protocol, Alice and Bob prepare and send
the coherent pulses with randomized phase. The tra-
ditional formulas of decoy-state method can be applied
directly. The coherent state whose phase is selected uni-
formly at random can be regard as a mixture of photon
number states
ραj = e
−µj
∞∑
n=0
µnj
n!
|n〉〈n|, (j = 0, 1, 2, z) (3)
where µj = |αj |2 is the intensity of the coherent
state |αj〉. Then the state when Alice decides not
sending and Bob decides to send ραk is ρα0αk =
e−µk
∑∞
n=0
µnk
n!
|0n〉〈0n|. With these convex forms, the
lower bound of the yield of the state ρz0 = |01〉〈01| can
be written into the following form
sz0 ≥ sLz0 =
µ22e
µ1S01 − µ21eµ2S02 − (µ22 − µ21)S00
µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1) , (4)
where the observable S0k are the yield of the sources ρ0k
for k = 1, 2, S00 is the yield when both Alice and Bob
send the vacuum state. Similarly, the lower bound of the
yield of the state ρz1 = |10〉〈10| can be written as
sz1 ≥ sLz1 =
µ22e
µ1S10 − µ21eµ2S20 − (µ22 − µ21)S00
µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1) , (5)
where the observable Sj0 are the yield of the sources when
Alice sends the coherent state ρj and Bob sends the vac-
uum state for j = 1, 2. With Eq.(4) and Eq.(5), the lower
bound of the yield of single-photon state in Z-basis, i.e.,
the state ρZ1 =
1
2
(ρz0 + ρz1), has the following form
sZ1 ≥ sZ1 =
1
2
(sLz0 + s
L
z1
). (6)
3Note: Replacing the source ρ2 used in Eqs.(4-6) with
the source ρz, we obtain the other lower bound of s
Z
1 .
With this replacement, source ρ2 is not used actually,
then the four-intensity decoy-state method can be sim-
plified to a three-intensity decoy-state method by taking
p2 = 0. On the one hand, the three-intensity decoy-state
method can be carried out easily in experiment. On the
other hand, if we are not attention to the limit security
distance but the usability key rate practically (such as
10−6 per-pulse), the key rate of the three-intensity decoy-
state method is only a little lower than (less than one per-
cent for the cases discussed in the numerical simulation)
the results for the four-intensity decoy-state method.
In the rest of this section, we show the formula to es-
timate the upper bound of eph
1
in Eq.(2) with the ob-
servable. The state of pulse pair when Alice sends the
coherent state |αA1 =
√
µ1e
iθA〉 and Bob sends the coher-
ent state |αB1 =
√
µ1e
iθB 〉 is
|αA1 〉|αB1 〉 = e−µ1
∞∑
n=0
(
√
2µ1e
iθB )n√
n!
|ψδ+n 〉. (7)
Similarly, we also have
|αA1 〉| − αB1 〉 = e−µ1
∞∑
n=0
(−√2µ1eiθB )n√
n!
|ψδ−n 〉. (8)
In Eq.(7) and Eq.(8), the k-photon twin-field state |ψδ+n 〉
is defined as follows
|ψδ+n 〉 =
1√
2n
n∑
m=0
√
n!eimδ√
m!(n−m)! |m〉|n−m〉, (9)
|ψδ−n 〉 =
1√
2n
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
√
n!eimδ√
m!(n−m)! |m〉|n−m〉, (10)
where δ = θA−θB. For the state in set C∆+ , the phase is
selected uniformly at random in the slice with |θA−θB| ≤
∆/2. Equivalently, in set C∆+ , the phase θB chosen by
Bob in |αA1 〉|αB1 〉 can be regarded as uniformly distributed
in [0, 2π) and the phase θA chosen by Alice satisfies the
condition |δ| ≤ ∆/2. For any fixed value δ, we have
ρδ+ =
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
|αA1 〉|αB1 〉〈αA1 |〈αB1 |dθ2
= e−2µ1
∞∑
n=0
(2µ1)
n
n!
|ψδ+n 〉〈ψδ
+
n |. (11)
Similarly, we also have
ρδ− =
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
|αA1 〉| − αB1 〉〈αA1 |〈−αB1 |dθ2
= e−2µ1
∞∑
n=0
(2µ1)
n
n!
|ψδ−n 〉〈ψδ
−
n |. (12)
Considering the single-photon twin-field states in C∆ =
C∆+ ∪ C∆− for a fixed δ, we have
ρδ1 =
1
2
(|ψδ+1 〉〈ψδ
+
1 |+ |ψδ
−
1 〉〈ψδ
−
1 |) = ρZ1 . (13)
So we know that the single-photon states in set C∆ and in
Z-basis have the same density matrices. The probability
to emit a single-photon pulse from C∆ is q1 = 2µ1e
−2µ1 .
With this relations, we know that the bit-flip error rate
of single-photon state in set C∆ is equal to the phase-
flip error rate eph
1
asymptotically. The bit-flip error rate
for all instances in set C∆ can be calculated with the
observable as follows
T∆ =
1
2
(T∆+ + T∆−) =
1
2
(
n
∆
+
1
11
N∆
+
11
+
n
∆
−
0
11
N∆
−
11
)
. (14)
Attribute all the error to the single-photon state and the
vacuum state, the upper bound of phase-flip error rate
eph
1
is
eph
1
≤ eph
1
=
T∆ − 1/2e−2µ1S00
2µ1e−2µ1sZ1
, (15)
where sZ1 is the lower bound of s
Z
1 given in Eq.(6). Then
the final key rate of per pulse can be calculated with
R = (1− pX)2{2pz(1− pz)
a1s1[1−H(eph1 )]− fSZH(EZ)}, (16)
where R is the final key rate, a1 = µze
−µz is the prob-
ability to emit a single-photon state from source ρz , s1
is the yield of the single-photon state in Z-window when
one party from Alice and Bob decides to send a signal
states, eph
1
is the phase-flip error rate for those instance
of s1, SZ and EZ are the yield and bit-flip error rate for
instances when both Alice and Bob choose Z-window.
III. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION ANALYSIS
In the real protocol, in order to extract the secure final
key, we have to consider the effect of statistical fluctua-
tions. To obtain the lower bound value for s1 and the up-
per bound value for eph
1
in the real protocol with finite N ,
one can implement the idea of Ref. [13], i.e., treating the
averaged yield. Accordingly, define 〈S〉 as the mean value
of yield S. Note that even though Sjk(j, k = 0, 1, 2, z)
are known values directly observed in the experiment,
the mean values 〈Sjk〉 are not. However, given the ob-
served values Sjk and the corresponding number of pulse
pairs, the confidence lower and upper limits of 〈Sjk〉 can
be calculated.
In order to obtain a tighter lower bound of 〈sZ1 〉, we
need introduce the following two yields
S1 =
1
2
(S01 + S10) =
n01
2N01
+
n10
2N10
, (17)
S2 =
1
2
(S02 + S20) =
n02
2N02
+
n20
2N20
, (18)
Replacing the observed yields with their mean values in
Eq.(6) and Eq.(15) we can formulate the lower bound of
4pd ηd f ǫ ea
1.0× 10−10 50% 1.1 1.0× 10−10 15%
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numeri-
cal simulations. pd: the dark count rate, ηd: the detection
efficiency of all detectors, f : the error correction inefficiency,
ǫ: the security bound considered in the statistical fluctuation
analysis, ea: the misalignment error.
〈sZ1 〉 and the upper bound of 〈eph1 〉 respectively. Explic-
itly, we have
〈sZ1 〉 ≥ 〈sZ1 〉 =
µ22e
µ1S1 − µ21eµ2S2 − (µ22 − µ21)S00
µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1) ,
(19)
and
〈eph
1
〉 ≤ 〈eph
1
〉 = T∆ − 1/2e
−2µ1S00
2µ1e−2µ1〈sZ1 〉
, (20)
with
Sk = Sk/(1 + δk), Sk = Sk/(1− δ′k). (21)
By using the multiplicative form of the Chernoff
bound [17], with a fixed failure probability ǫ, we can give
an interval of 〈Sk〉 with the observable Sk, [Sk, Sk], which
can bound the value of 〈Sk〉 with a probability of at least
1− ǫ.
With the mean values 〈sZ1 〉 and 〈eph1 〉 defined in Eq.(19)
and Eq.(20), the lower bound of the yield s1 and the up-
per bound of the phase-flip error rata eph
1
corresponding
to s1 in Eq.(16) can be estimated by
s1 = 〈sZ1 〉(1− δc1), eph1 = 〈eph1 〉(1 + δ′c1 ). (22)
With the lower bound of s1 and the upper bound of
eph
1
in Eq.(22), the final key rate can be calculated with
Eq.(16).
Note: In Eq.(19), by using the method shown in [17],
we can treat the observable S2 and S00 jointly when we
considering the effect of statistical fluctuation. Then we
obtain a tighter lower bound of 〈sL1 〉. Furthermore, S00 is
the common variable in both the lower bound of the yield
〈sZ1 〉 and the upper bound of phase-flip error rate 〈eph1 〉
shown in Eq.(19) and Eq.(20) respectively. The final key
is simply the worst-case result over all possible values for
S00 ∈ [S00, S00]. S00 has a teeny effect on the final key
rate as its value is small comparing to the others. With
the results of numerical simulations, we conclude that the
final key rate only be improved just a little (less than 0.1
percent) by using these improved methods.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we present some results of the numer-
ical simulation. We focus on the symmetric case where
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Optimal secret key rate (per pulse) as a
function of the distance with different N by 4-inensity decoy-
state method. The asymptotic results are shown in the red
solid line. The blue dotted line, the green dash-dot line and
the black dashed line are the results with N = 1014, N = 1013
and N = 1012, respectively.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Optimal secret key rate (per pulse) as a
function of the distance by 4-intensity and 3-intensity decoy-
state methods with N = 1012. The asymptotic results with
infinite number of pulses are shown in the red solid line. The
blue dashed line and the green dash-dot line are the results for
4-intensity and 3-intensity decoy-state methods, respectively.
the two channel transmissions from Alice to Charlie and
from Bob to Charlie are equal. We also assume that
Charlie’s detectors are identical, i.e., they have the same
dark count rates and detection efficiencies, and their de-
tection efficiencies do not depend on the incoming sig-
nals. We shall estimate what values would be probably
observed in the normal cases by the linear models as pre-
viously. The values of the experimental parameters used
in the simulations are listed in Table I.
We optimize all parameters, pX , p1, p2 pz, µ1, µ2, µz
and ∆ by the method of full optimization. The results of
5Distance (km)0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
O
pt
im
al
 v
lu
e 
of
 ∆
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
FIG. 3: (Color online) Optimal value of ∆ corresponding to
the optimal secret key rate with N = 1012.
optimized key rate with different number of pulse pairs
by four-inensity decoy-state method are shown in Fig. 1.
In it, we use the red solid line to denote the asymp-
totic results with infinite number of pulses. The optimal
key rate with different number of pulse pairs N = 1014,
N = 1013 and N = 1012 are shown by the blue dot-
ted line, the green dash-dot line and the black dashed
line respectively. In Fig. 2, we plot the final key rates
with the four-intensity decoy-state method and the three-
intensity decoy-state method when the number of pulse
pairs N = 1012. We can see that the optimal key rates
for the three-intensity decoy-state method is nearly equal
to the results for the four-intensity decoy-state method
when we are attention to the usability key rate practi-
cally (such as 10−6 per-pulse). The improvement be-
comes more and more evident when we are regard to the
long distance communication. In Fig. 3, we plot the op-
timal value of ∆ for different distances with N = 1012 by
four-inensity decoy-state method.
Also, according to the observed data there [19], we
use a linear loss model to estimate the actual loss in the
experiment for 404 km of ultralow-loss optical fiber (0.16
dB/km). Assuming the same device parameter (pd =
7.2× 10−8, ηd = 0.5525, f = 1.16, ǫ = 1.0× 10−10, ea =
2% and N = 6.0 × 1014), we make the optimization by
using our sending-or-not protocol with the four-intensity
decoy-state method shown above. We obtain a final key
rate of 141 bit per second (bps), which is more than 4.4×
105 times higher than the reported experimental result,
3.2× 10−4 bps.
V. CONCLUSION
In real setups of QKD, the practical situations with
a few different intensities rather than infinite number
of different intensities, a phase slice of appropriate size
rather than infinitely small size and the statistical fluc-
tuations must be considered. We first present the decoy-
state method with a few different intensities and a phase
slice of appropriate size. Then we show that the decoy-
state method is a highly practical scheme even when the
statistical fluctuations are considered. Numerical simula-
tion shows that, the performance of our method is com-
parable to the asymptotic case for which the key size is
large enough. Our results show that practical implemen-
tations of the sending-or-not quantum key distribution
can be both secure and efficient.
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